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Abstract 
The workshop of the Association for Public Economic Theory on behavioral and experimental public economics 
was held at Ecole Normale Superieure de Lyon, Universite de Lyon, from June 24 to June 26, 2008. Thirty 
papers were presented in addition to keynotes by Charlie Plott and John List. The focus of the workshop was to 
test theoretical models using experimental methods to increase our understanding of the efficiency of 
mechanisms supporting the provision of public goods, social cooperation, and voting systems. This special issue 
aims at showing how lively and diversified the ongoing experimental research in public economics has come to 
be. We highlight three topics in particular: the power of voting and legal enforcement systems, the efficiency of 
various institutions to support cooperation in social dilemma games, and auctions. 
 
 
 
The workshop of the Association for Public Economic Theory on behavioral and 
experimental public economics held in Lyon in 2009  attracted a large audience of public 
economists interested in exploring  the  behavioral foundations of individual and collective 
decision-making in the context of public economics. By allowing  the possibility of testing 
theoretical models,  experimental methods have significantly  increased our understanding of 
major issues in public economics such as the relative efficiency of various institutions 
supporting the provision of public goods and cooperation, mechanism design for public 
policies or voting systems. This special issue demonstrates how lively and diversified  the 
ongoing experimental research in public economics has come to be. Among the numerous 
submissions to this issue, we have selected eight papers that illustrate various facets of 
behavioral public economics. The contributions to this special issue focus on three main sets 
of questions: what are the power and the limitations of voting and legal enforcement systems, 
especially in terms of enhanced cooperation?  Can one improve the provision of public goods 
by allowing sequential contributions, a mix of sanctions and rewards, or multiple punishment 
stages? Can speculation be used as a collusion-breaking device in auctions and is the potential 
hypothetical bias in valuation tasks without incentives originating in the preference elicitation 
method or in the preference formation? 
The first set of papers investigates the interactions between legal and social sanctions and the 
power and limitations of voting systems. Legal norm enforcement is in many cases and 
ineffective deterrent due to relatively low risks of detection, On the other hand, a significant 
body of experimental evidence has been collected in the last decade suggesting  both the 
importance of decentralized sanctions and the disciplining effect of these social sanctions on 
individuals’ behavior in situations where the society faces a social dilemma. In such an 
environment, people have the opportunity to punish their group members based on their level 
of cooperation, i.e. their contribution to a public good. Usually, centralized and decentralized 
sanctioning institutions are studied in isolation although they coexist in most real settings. 
Therefore, it is difficult to assess their relative influence on human behavior and to compare 
their efficiency ceteris paribus. The first paper of this issue by Sebastian Kube and Christian 
Traxler offers a fascinating experimental analysis of the relationships between legal and social 
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norm enforcement, in examining whether these institutions are complements or substitutes. 
Their experimental design allows them to measure to which extent the existence of a legal 
enforcement institution affects the individuals’ willingness to implement decentralized 
sanctions to their group members. The baseline treatment consists of a standard public good 
game without any legal rule but in which group members can sanction their group members at 
a cost to themselves. A second treatment introduces a legal enforcement institution that 
sanctions any detected deviation from the optimal contribution to a public good after players 
have decided on exerting their right to sanction group members. The design is also original in 
that the strategy method is used to elicit the players’ willingness to condition their sanctioning 
behavior on various possible triples of contributions of their group members. Interestingly, 
Kube and Traxler find that the introduction of a legal institution crowds-out the social norm 
enforcement without eliminating it. Their experiment also reveals that a higher level of 
cooperation is achieved when the legal institution complements the decentralized enforcement 
institution. This evidence in favor of combining legal and social sanctions deserves all the 
more attention as a higher cooperation is achieved at a lower overall cost. 
In the first paper, sanctions resulted either from the law or from an individual choice. But one 
can find many intermediate situations in which a community decides on the regime that 
governs if and how deviations from a social norm are punished. If the members of these 
communities share the same social preferences and similar productive characteristics, an 
agreement should not be very hard to reach. The situation is much more complex when 
heterogeneity is present.  Charles N. Noussair and Fangfang Tan also examine the effect of 
sanctions on contributions in a public goods game. However, they introduce an environment 
in which individuals have the opportunity to vote on the implementation of the punishment 
institution in their group.  Therefore, it is not only the enforcement of sanctions that is 
endogenous, but also the institution itself. A novelty of their experimental design lies in the 
fact that the players’ type is determined by two possible returns from the public goods. Group 
members vote on whether the sanctioning institution should target the individuals who 
contributed more than the average of the group or those who contributed less than the 
average, conditional on their type. The results confirm that heterogeneity reduces the 
likelihood of reaching a consensus for implementing the most efficient sanctioning institution 
that targets the individuals who contribute below the average unconditional on their 
productivity type. Most groups end up with a regime without punishment because individuals 
vote defensively to avoid to be punished by targeting the other group members’ type. 
A voting procedure does not necessarily allow individuals to implement more efficient rules, 
but its very existence may also affect individual behavior after the vote has taken place. This 
hypothesis could hold not only in the domain of public good provision, but also in the 
political arena.  In particular, one might wonder whether and how the existence of a voting 
procedure and its modalities condition the behavior of individuals once elected.  There is 
surprisingly little empirical evidence in economics on this issue. Hong Geng, Arne Robert 
Weiss and Irenaeus Wolff address the question of how the nature of political campaigns can 
prevent the risk that an elected leader takes full selfish advantage of his position. They have 
designed an experiment in which one electoral campaign is based on the description of the 
candidates’ personality while another campaign is based on the candidates’ explicit promises 
on future actions if elected. The elected candidate then becomes the decider in a following 
dictator game with three recipients and his behavior can be compared with that of randomly 
selected leaders in a control treatment. Surprisingly,  experiments with both German and 
Chinese subjects show that dictators tend to behave more pro-socially in the absence of 
elections than after campaigns in which no promises are announced. This striking result 
indicates that personality-based campaigns may reduce the social distance between the elected 
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leader and his voters but may also increase the elected candidate’s feeling of entitlement. 
Another interesting result the authors find is that the existence of promises-based campaign 
leads to higher dictators’ transfers, which cannot be interpreted as  being a consequence of an 
inflation of promises resulting from the electoral competition.  This study reveals that the 
combination of competition, cheap talk, and guilt-aversion increases the power of elections to 
limit the opportunistic use of power but not as much as theoretically predicted. This study 
should have interest beyond public economists, especially in political science. 
 
The second set of papers in this special issue aim at contributing to the experimental literature 
on the design of mechanisms influencing cooperation in situations involving social dilemmas. 
Various institutions have been considered such as allowing the individuals to communicate 
before making their decisions, introducing a leader in order to influence the rest of the group 
through his example or his sacrifice, permitting individuals to punish or to exclude free-riders, 
or introducing voluntary mobility across groups. Most of these institutions have been shown 
to improve cooperation but their contribution to social welfare is not straightforward. The 
three following studies contribute to this analysis. 
In most sequential public goods experiments, the selection of leaders is either random or 
based on past behavior or intrinsic characteristics. Authors have mainly considered leadership 
by example. There are many instances, however, in which individuals self-select as first 
movers and this may result in detrimental consequences. Varian (1994)  proposed a model in 
which individuals can decide to move first  and thereby commit to free-ride in order to signal 
to the other players that they will have to contribute more to provide the public goods. Thus, 
the opportunity to commit first may aggravate the free-riding problem. Daniele Nosenzo and 
Martin Sefton embed Varian’s model in two extended endogenous timing games with either 
observable delay or action commitment. In the first game, there are two contribution stages 
and players commit to contribute in the first or the second stage before choosing their actual 
contribution. In the second game, each player decides on either contributing or waiting. The 
theoretical predictions are derived for both standard selfish preferences and for inequality 
averse preferences. Nosanzo and Sefton test the predictions of these games by means of a 
clever  experiment in which the players can choose the timing of their contribution and 
commit to contribute only once. Interestingly, the results show that most participants avoid 
committing in the first stage of both extended games contrary to the predictions of the game 
with observable delay. This demonstrates that the opportunity to commit does not 
automatically aggravate the free-riding problem. However,  when a player with a high value 
of the public good commits to contribute first, then the total amount of the public good is 
decreased. 
Reprisals in case of deviations from social norms are frequently observed in the laboratory 
even though  they do not belong to the equilibrium of the game. A criticism pointed out 
initially by Houser, Xiao, McCabe, and Smith (2008) is that sanctions may be detrimental to 
efficiency in the short run because they destroy resources. The use of rewards instead of 
sanctions may avoid this difficulty. Nathalie Colombier, David Masclet, Daniel Mirza, and 
Claude Montmarquette provide an original study in which they compare the impact of 
rewards and sanctions on international cooperation. Indeed, if one  interprets voluntary 
contributions to public goods as an individual decision, it might be also relevant to use this 
game to investigate international cooperation in the presence of social dilemmas. One can 
think of environmental issues but there are many other examples. Colombier et al. consider 
cooperation in counterterrorism in which international security is treated as a public good. 
This constitutes a very stimulating approach. In their experiment, each country is faced with 
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three possible uses of its resources. It may invest in an international collective action reducing 
the expected losses from a terrorist attack. Alternatively, it may invest in its own national 
security, entailing a displacement of the terrorists’ targets towards less insured countries. 
Finally, it can invest in other activities that are not related to security. The results demonstrate 
that the players prefer investing in their own security than in collective action. On the other 
hand,  the introduction of endogenous sanctions and rewards increases cooperation. While the 
use of reprisals reduce efficiency, as stated by Houser et al. (2008), rewards generate positive 
effects on welfare and they are much more frequently used by players than sanctions, 
probably because they expect some reciprocity from other players. These very neat findings 
support the idea that more effective counterterrorism policies require some institutional 
coordination. 
Andreas Nicklisch and Irenaeus Wolff propose that endogenous punishment in social 
dilemma situations may be driven more by deviations from an absolute norm than by 
deviations from a relative norm that fluctuates with the average contribution in the group.  
This  distinction   has important implication for the predictive power of theories of pro-social 
behavior for sanctions in public good games. To address this, Nicklisch and Wolff have 
designed a public good experiment with multi-stage punishment including a finite but 
endogenous number of stages. After the group members have decided on their contribution 
levels to the public account, they can announce whether and to which group members they 
want to assign punishment points; next, they decide on the punishment they actually 
implement. The steps of announcements and sanctions can be repeated until players are no 
longer willing to sanction others. The results show no evidence of counter-punishment in 
iterated stages of punishment. Instead, they tend to support the influence of an absolute 
cooperation norm that corresponds to the contribution of the full endowment. 
 
The issue ends with two contributions related to auctions. One paper examines speculation as 
a collusion breaking device and the other studies the hypothetical bias in the elicitation of 
preferences with second price auctions. Florence Naegelen, Michel Mougeot, Benjamin 
Pelloux, and Jean-Louis Rullière analyze auction mechanisms for allocating CO2 emission 
permits in the laboratory taking into account the concern for a possible collusion between 
bidders. They test experimentally the hypothesis that the presence of speculators may break 
collusion in this market by means of a 2x2 design. In their experiment, two auction 
mechanisms are introduced: sealed bid auctions with uniform price and ascending clock 
auctions.  In one treatment, high emitters and low emitters participate in the auction and 
speculation is ruled out, while in the other, a third category of players called non-emitters, is 
introduced who can not themselves use permits, but can speculate in the market. A spot 
market for trades opens after the auctions take  place. As predicted, the experimental results 
show that the presence of speculators  results in  higher auction prices and higher revenues for 
the sellers in the sealed bid auctions with uniform prices, This may be because the compliance 
agents tend to adopt outbidding strategies. The impact of speculators is weaker in the 
ascending clock auctions and prices are lower than under the other auction mechanism. 
Overall, however, the presence of speculators reduces efficiency under both mechanisms by 
impeding the allocation of permits to the producers with the highest values. 
Finally, the issue closes with a paper that takes  a more methodological perspective. Indeed, 
behavior in auctions may differ according whether choices entail actual monetary 
consequences or only hypothetical ones. This phenomenon is known as the hypothetical bias 
which could originate either in the preference elicitation method or in the preference 
formation. Nicolas Jacquemet, Robert-Vincent Joule, Stéphane Luchini, and Jason F. Shogren 
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investigate the origin of the discrepancy between values elicited with or without monetary 
incentives by comparing bids in the two treatments of two experiments using the same 
Vickrey auction procedures. In one experiment, they use induced values to study preference 
elicitation, while in the second, they elicit homegrown values to identify preference formation 
regarding a real non-market good (the protection of dolphins). According to the treatment, the 
choices do or do not have  monetary implications. Interestingly, Jacquemet et al. do not find 
any evidence of a hypothetical bias when using induced values whereas they observe a 
substantial hypothetical bias when eliciting homegrown values with much higher bids in the 
hypothetical than in the incentivized treatment. These findings  tend to  support to the role of 
preference formation in driving the discrepancy of valuations with and without monetary 
incentives. Another lesson is that it is especially important to commit individuals not to 
violate their budget constraint when one intends to reveal demand for non-market goods 
properly. 
 
In conclusion, we hope that this special issue will contribute to and encourage the 
development of behavioral and experimental public economics. This is not only because the 
following contributions provide fascinating new evidence on public economics issues, but 
also because they should lead to enriched theoretical models by incorporating these new 
empirical findings regarding human motivation.  
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1. Sebastian Kube and Christian Traxler - The interaction of legal and social norm 
enforcement 
2. Charles N. Noussair and Fangfang Tan - Voting on punishment systems within a 
heterogeneous group 
3. Hong Geng, Arne Robert Weiss and Irenaeus Wolff - The limited power of voting to limit 
power 
4. Daniele Nosenzo and Martin Sefton - Endogenous move structure and voluntary 
provision of public goods: theory and experiment   
5. Nathalie Colombier, David Masclet, Daniel Mirza, and Claude Montmarquette - Global 
Security Policies Against Terrorism and the Free Riding Problem: An Experimental 
Approach 
6. Andreas Nicklisch and Irenaeus Wolff - Cooperation norms in multiple-stage 
punishment 
7. Florence Naegelen, Michel Mougeot, Benjamin Pelloux, and Jean-Louis Rullière - 
Breaking collusion in auctions through speculation: an experiment on CO2 emission 
permit market 
8. Nicolas Jacquemet, Robert-Vincent Joule, Stéphane Luchini, and Jason F. Shogren - Do 
people always pay less than they say? Testbed laboratory experiments with IV and HG 
values 
